[Continuing the first article] There are other attribution tests under the ILC Articles and beyond. One of them, surely, can have its attribution threshold satisfied should a state commission or sponsor a non-state actor to undertake information operations that result in wrongdoing? What about the ‘complete dependence' test invented by the ICJ? Doubtful. Anyone wanting to play with the latent ambiguity of its language is welcome to do so, but the important takeaway is, don't worry if you have no idea what ‘complete dependence' means, because no one else does either. You can have a bash at elaborating, of course. For example, it could be submitted that complete dependence is when a non-state actor would not be able to function but for the support of a state. Anyway, this test could become less clearer the more it is applied in practice or speculated on in commentary. So here's to leaving it be in the pile of invented terms that facilitate the avoidance of international rules.

Information operations can impact societies in many ways. Whether by undermining specific human rights, for example, as a result of crossing the line between ‘lawful influence and unlawful manipulation’ of thought, or by eroding trust in democratic institutions, these operations pose multifaceted risks to domestic, regional, and international stability. A prominent example is the false claims created and spread through information and communications technologies during COVID-19, which stimulated distrust in the institutions, policies and people that sought to effectively address the pandemic. The relevance of international law to information operations is often taken as a given. Yet it is contingent on a number of factors. One such factor comes from within the body of rules that constitute the international legal order, which concerns whether any of the primary rules potentially applicable to information operations can actually be brought to bear on claims seeking to establish legal accountability. This factor arises because of the secondary rules that are inseparable from such claims, which also affect options for legal accountability more generally. But these secondary rules get neglected in related analysis and discussion, which in turn contributes to the assumption that international law is relevant to information operations, in particular with respect to pursuing legal accountability for their harmful impacts.

The Western-backed regime change in Ukraine in 2014 enabled Washington and its allies to transform Ukraine from an ally of Russia to a frontline against Russia. The Nuland-Pyatt call revealed that Washington had decided who would represent the new government in Kiev. On the first day after the coup, the CIA and MI6 formed a partnership with the intelligence agencies in Ukraine, which had to be rebuilt from scratch to be used as a partner against Russia. Ukraine's General Prosecutor, Viktor Shokin, explains that Washington demanded to it decide on all new government appointments and was running Ukraine like a colony.

Parliamentarians and other commentators routinely assert that UK withdrawal from the ECHR would somehow breach - or undermine - the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. This report shows that the Belfast Agreement does not require either the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland to remain a party to the ECHR. Each state has the same right under Article 58 of the ECHR to withdraw from the Convention, a right under international law that is not qualified in any way by the Belfast Agreement. UK withdrawal from the ECHR would not constitute a breach of the Belfast Agreement.

Commentators have long observed that international humanitarian law (IHL) — which is intended to limit human suffering in armed conflict — is often invoked by belligerents to legitimize, rather than constrain, conduct harmful to civilians. Concerns that expedient interpretations of IHL are undermining its protective function have been voiced with renewed urgency in recent years, particularly in the wake of the devastating campaign that Israel has been waging in Gaza since October 2023. While much of the suffering endured by civilians during the hostilities between Israel and Hamas-led armed groups stems from blatant disregard for IHL, there have also been attempts to dress harmful Israeli conduct in legal garb....

Two recent convictions of Syrian nationals for crimes committed during the civil war merit attention. On 16 June 2025, Syrian-born Alaa M. was convicted by a Frankfurt court for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed at several medical and military facilities. A few weeks earlier, on 28 May 2025, a Paris court made headlines when it sentenced former spokesperson and senior official of the Syrian armed group Jaysh al-Islam, Majdi N., for complicity in the war crimes of conscripting minors and of participating in a group formed with the intent to commit war crimes. Their convictions are part of the countless cases to surface from the devastation of Syria’s long-running civil war and are a testament to the functioning of the principle of universal jurisdiction. In both cases, digital tools and evidence were crucial.

Andrew Cayley oversaw the ICC's investigation into Israel and Hamas. As he gathered harrowing testimonies, he began to receive threatening phone calls. The work was emotionally gruelling and involved gathering evidence and testimonies from Israeli hostage survivors who had spent months in underground tunnels, watching videos of young Israeli girls being shot dead at point-blank range and interviews with horrifically maimed children from Gaza. In May 2024, a bipartisan group of US senators had arranged a virtual meeting with senior members of the ICC to discuss the Palestine case. Politicians in the US had already been threatening to retaliate against the court if it proceeded with the arrest warrants against Israel. Lindsey Graham, a staunch supporter of Israel, "was screaming at us," recalled Cayley. Other ICC employees who were in that meeting have confirmed to me that Graham was threatening that they would face sanctions and that the court would be shut down.

In his first months back in office, U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to use military force to seize Greenland and the Panama Canal, suggested that the United States could take ownership of Gaza after the expulsion of two million Palestinians, and demanded that Ukraine give up territory to Russia in exchange for a cease-fire. These acts and statements might appear to be just a handful of examples of Trump's typical wide-ranging and hyperbolic bluster. But in fact, they all form part of a cohesive assault on a long-standing principle of international law: that states are prohibited from threatening or using military force against other states to resolve disputes. [A tour de force from these two respected authors].

On the night of June 12, 2025, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began an ongoing campaign of airstrikes across Iran, bombing military facilities, nuclear sites, civilian industrial sites, and civilian apartment buildings. An IDF airstrike on one apartment building reportedly killed 20 children. By June 19, IDF airstrikes had killed at least 263 civilians and wounded at least 335 civilians, according to one widely-cited Iranian NGO. Israel calls its military campaign "Operation Rising Lion." Iran has responded with ballistic missile attacks striking military facilities, civilian apartment buildings, and at least one hospital. Both Israel and Iran are violating international humanitarian law and must stop. This essay will focus on the legal status of Israel's military offensive under the UN Charter.

After a stern warning from Donald Trump, Israel and Iran appear finally to be observing a US-brokered ceasefire announced by Donald Trump overnight on June 23. But just as it remains unclear what the state of the conflict is, many other uncertainties remain when it comes to the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. We still don't know the extent to which Iran's stock of enriched uranium and the capability to use it have been destroyed. But leaving aside such practical considerations, the US bombing raid also constituted an attack on the prevailing international legal order. In some ways, the US actions echo the 1981 Israeli strike on Osirak when the Israeli Air Force attacked and partially destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, killing ten Iraqi soldiers and one French technician. However, the US attack can be seen as more serious because it has been launched in a far more fragile and geopolitical environment. Moreover, the state violating the legal rules is the erstwhile guardian of the legal order -- the USA.

Professor Milanovic concludes:

1. No evidence has come to light supporting the view that there was an imminent nuclear armed attack by Iran against Israel. No other argument can support Israel's use of force.
2. Israel's use of force is therefore illegal. And, again with greatest respect to colleagues who think differently, this is not a close, tough or hard case. The assessment would be different only if information came to light that clearly indicated that Iran did decide to make a nuclear bomb and did decide to use it against Israel - the public statements by Iranian officials simply do not qualify as such. None of them have said that they are building a bomb, or that they would use it against Israel.
3. The use of force by the United States against Iran is also illegal, since it cannot be justified as the collective self-defence of Israel.
4. Third states have a legal obligation to refrain from providing aid and assistance to unlawful uses of force.
5. It is likely justified for a state exercising its right to self-defence to violate the airspace of a third state, if doing so was the only way of effectively exercising self-defence against its adversary, the aggressor state.
6. It is likely justified for third states to assist Israel in deflecting Iranian missiles, but only if there was evidence, either generally or specifically, that Iranian missile strikes exceed the necessity and proportionality criteria of self-defence.

Even if the broadest possible (legally plausible) understanding of anticipatory self-defence was taken as correct, Israel's use of force against Iran would be illegal. This is because there is little evidence that Iran has irrevocably committed itself to attacking Israel with a nuclear weapon, once it develops this capability. And even if such an intention was assumed – again, it would be for Israel to provide any further evidence of such intention – the author argues with cogent scholarship that he does not see how it could plausibly be argued that using force today was the only option available.

This paper challenges the mainstream narrative of the Ukraine conflict, highlighting historical provocations, media bias and media misinformation and the role of Western powers in escalating tensions. We are told that peace was almost achieved in April 2022, but then the west intervened to tell President Zelenskyy that he should fight on. Since then, hundreds of thousands have lost their lives, on both sides of the battlefield. As more information becomes available to those prepared to look beyond legacy media, it becomes harder to hide the truth. It is therefore remarkable that there are still those who maintain the official narrative. Does that actually assist a country at war? Or does it build a false expectation on the part of its supporters that perpetuates the fighting rather than supporting a political solution? International diplomacy has dissolved and has been replaced by aggressive rhetoric – threats that may be self-fulfilling. Looking at the available evidence, the paper lays to rest arguments about whether there was NATO provocation preceding the invasion of Ukraine. It advocates for diplomacy and balanced reporting to uncover the truth.

On 7 October 2023, the long-lasting Israel-Hamas conflict escalated significantly in scale and violence. Reports reveal that the Israeli military have employed Artificial Intelligence Decision Support Systems ('AI-DSS') to identify individuals in targeting situations. Another report has indicated that the Israeli military used facial recognition technology ('FRT') to identify Palestinians in Gaza. Scholars are debating the legality of AI-DSS under International Humanitarian Law ('IHL'), and the extent to which military commanders can rely on AI for targeting decisions. This article describes the challenges in human-machine interaction with a focus on algorithmically generated recommendations and the responsibility of military commanders in this regard. The article concludes that, while the use of FRT can enhance accuracy in identifying individuals and support adherence to IHL obligations, its effectiveness depends on the operational environment. It also emphasises the importance of improving military commanders' technical literacy of AI-DSS and ensuring that sufficient time is taken to verify the accuracy of algorithmically generated targets.

With the end of unipolarity, security competition among the great powers - China, Russia, and the United States - is back with a vengeance. Given the possibility of war between rival great powers, the purpose of this article is to analyze great power war. The author's central claim is that war is the dominant feature of life in the international system, mainly because of the nature of politics. In particular, politics is a fundamentally conflictual enterprise with the ever-present possibility of violence in the background. This argument, which differs from Carl von Clausewitz's famous claim that war is an extension of politics by other means, is rarely made in the international relations literature. Professor Mearsheimer examines how the interplay between politics and war affects how states both initiate and conduct armed conflict. What are the limits on states starting wars, and how do political and military factors contribute to their escalation? He argues that it is almost impossible to put meaningful limits on when states can start wars, and that there is a powerful tendency for wars to escape political control and escalate.
It is commonplace to hear that the world is witnessing the return of great power politics, which were taken off the table during the unipolar moment (1991-2017). After all, it is impossible to have security competition or war between great powers when there is only one great power on the planet. This is not to deny that the United States - the sole great power - fought wars during unipolarity, but they were unfair fights against minor powers. Yet we are now in a multipolar world. Great power war is once again a possibility and security competition among the great powers - China, Russia, and the United States - is intensifying. Thus, the time is ripe to examine the fundamentals of great power politics.

The Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare, Second Edition, is published as a special volume of International Law Studies (ILS). ILS is a professionally edited and peer-reviewed journal of the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. First published in 1895, ILS is the oldest continually published international law journal in the United States. ILS provides a forum for prominent international law scholars and legal practitioners to publish articles that contribute to the development and broader understanding of international law as it relates to military affairs, war, and peace. The journal focuses on legal questions arising from use of force controversies, the law of armed conflict, maritime security, the law of the sea, and general public international law as it pertains to military strategy and international peace and security.

"Humanitarian corridors" are not a humanitarian activity but rather a military operation. The term describes the implementation of measures designed to react in the very last resort to a dire situation of the civilian population, often the result of a series of legal violations. Moreover, the expression "humanitarian corridor" cannot be found in relevant international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties. The term poses both legal and practical challenges. The author addresses some of these in her chapter in Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict: Select Issues. This post aims to shed light on an indirect consequence of this semantic indeterminacy.

New military technologies are transforming the contemporary battlefield and raise complex ethical and legal questions previously unaddressed. This essay makes three novel contributions to the significant debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and military AI in the legal and ethical literature. First, it puts forward a normative argument against AWS—even if they outperform humans in adhering to the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. This argument is grounded in the critical importance of the human capacity to act beyond the strict letter of the law. The essay contends that this capacity is central to the regulation of warfare, which permits, rather than obligates, the use of force against legitimate targets. Second, it offers a doctrinal analysis of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL)—the two principal legal regimes that regulate armed conflicts under international law—providing a fresh perspective on how they intersect in the context of AWS. Finally, the essay explores the extent to which its normative argument is persuasive in the context of military AI beyond AWS, an area that is rapidly evolving and already extensively employed in current conflicts. It examines the similarities and differences between these emerging technologies, and reflects on the implications of those differences for the desirable regulation of both technologies.

Modern criminology invites us to revisit our approach to the Nord Stream sabotage and ultimately forces us to explain the decisions made by the Nord Stream saboteurs and the reasons which led them to target the Nord Stream pipelines in the deeper waters of the Danish and Swedish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Baltic Sea, rather than opting for a mission in the considerably shallower waters of the German Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 could have easily been targeted at once. This fundamentally raises critical questions regarding the saboteur's tactical operation, raising the possibility that submarines were involved in the Nord Stream sabotage. Were the Naval surface activities in the Baltic Sea a mere representation of the covered activities below?

Space is an increasingly militarized domain, with the potential to be a source and place of armed conflict. In recent years, tests of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capable of neutralizing civilian and military satellites have fuelled fears of warfare in that domain. These satellites might be considered attractive targets for states in situations of armed conflict, making ASAT weapons central to assessing the threat environment in space. Space debris that might result from ASAT weapon use is of particular concern, as it threatens other satellites in orbit, many of which underpin the operation of human societies and the function of global economies. Although states recognize this threat, attempts at weapons control have failed. Instead, we must look to existing international law that governs military activities in space. Yet, how the jus ad bellum, which regulates when states may use force, applies to ASAT weapons has received little attention. This is despite state assertions of their right to act in self-defence in space. This article argues that jus ad bellum regulation of ASAT technologies directly addresses state concerns regarding protecting their space assets and avoiding conflict in space. This author contends that states acting defensively in space are restricted by the requirements of jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality in their choice of targets, protecting civilians and the interests of other states. A clearer understanding of how these jus ad bellum requirements apply to ASAT weapon use helps decision makers avoid lawful acts of self-defence being characterized as unlawful uses of force. Adherence to these jus ad bellum rules ultimately helps secure international peace and security on Earth and beyond Earth's atmosphere.

The UK prides itself as a nation committed to the international rule of law. Successive governments have repeatedly reaffirmed that commitment. The Integrated Review Refresh of 2023 promised the UK would, "work to shape an open and stable international order" based on "respect for the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and international law". More recently, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has voiced his own belief in international law, stating that he thought it was very important, "that we keep to our commitments on international law".

British party politics has in recent decades become an exercise in evading reality, only dealing with the world — and our country's material conditions — as our leaders would wish them to be. Westminster's chaotic reaction to Washington's abrupt, if long-telegraphed, about-turn on the Ukraine war and European security reveals that our rulers are belatedly discovering the cost of inhabiting a dreamworld. This is a far graver crisis than Suez, in which Britain was forcefully shown that, rather than being an equal partner in global affairs, it was merely a subordinate client. Today's events, proceeding so rapidly that almost any commentary is immediately out of date, shows we are not even that. The author cannot think of a British government in his lifetime more hostage to events outside of its control. In the sudden loss of decades-long defence assumptions, it is a crisis closer to that of 1940 than 1956.
Yet having failed to read the runes decades ago, or even since 2022, Britain will not create a functioning new security architecture over the course of this week. If we were as close to war as Keir Starmer suggests, the Government would not be proceeding with the ruinous Chagos deal nor Net Zero: Britain's need to rethink its strategic assumptions over the coming years must be distinguished from Labour's desire to strike a patriotic pose for narrow electoral purposes.

The study of underwater cultural heritage, and that of sunken warships, has typically focused on the legal protections that surround a site in the years, or often centuries, after the sinking. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has given cause to study the topic in a more modern context. Several Russian Naval vessels have been sunk by Ukraine, the most famous being the Black Sea flagship, the Moskva, in April 2022. Following the sinking, Ukraine stated the Moskva was now a heritage site, with a Ukrainian Defence Minister joking that the wreck was simply "one more diving spot."
This article will examine the legal status of the Moskva as she lies on the seabed. While it is right that the site should in due course be a protected heritage site, the current legal regime in place between Russia and Ukraine is the law of armed conflict. This gives rise to a different set of legal rights and obligations. Although the Ukrainian declaration has clear benefits in terms of Kyiv's ongoing war narrative, the article suggests that it was not strictly necessary and perhaps premature. Instead, as a belligerent, Ukraine may exploit the wreck as part of its own ongoing war effort.

This report explores the European Commission's increasing use of its budgetary powers to promote its political agenda under the guise of advancing 'EU values'. It reveals how the EU leverages programmes to fund non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks, many of which are explicitly aligned with the Commission's vision of deeper European integration. This 'propaganda by proxy' is fundamentally undemocratic. In effect, many EU citizens who are opposed to 'more Europe' as the answer to every problem are funding the promotion of greater federalism. More conservative voters and countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, are facing EU- funded promotion of liberal-progressive values they do not share. Elected national governments are coming under attack from groups funded by Brussels. The report concludes that the EU's use of NGOs as instruments of political advocacy reflects a broader trend of anti-democratic governance.

A specific set of challenges facing the intelligence community in a contemporary environment is characterized by composite and dynamic hybrid threats. An understanding of the reciprocal interaction is required between the intelligence actors responsible for intelligence analysis and dissemination, and key societal actors responsible for crafting responses to hybrid threats and building societal resilience. Three processes are identified as critical for the intelligence community's ability to proactively counter hybrid threats: intelligence analysis; aggregation and communication of intelligence; and reception and absorption of intelligence among key societal actors. The interconnections between these areas are visualized in the Intelligence Analysis Interaction Model, intending to provide a framework for understanding the dynamics of hybrid threats and their evolution over time, and the intelligence community's interactive engagement with societal actors aiming to counter hybrid threats and build resilience. The framework contributes to improved tools for identifying and analyzing the nexus between threats and vulnerabilities, building resilience, and devising whole-of-society responses to hybrid threats.

As the incoming Trump administration prepares to launch negotiations aimed at ending the current phase of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, the question of security guarantees is certain to feature prominently in talks. Talk of security guarantees is nothing new — indeed, it has underscored much of the drama that has unfolded since Russia's initial military buildup in 2021. Moscow insisted that the United States and NATO undertake legally binding obligations in its two "draft treaties," published on the eve of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aimed at guaranteeing Ukraine's neutrality and rolling back NATO forces in Central and Eastern Europe to where they were prior to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Kyiv, for its part, naturally wants ironclad measures that can ensure it will not fall victim to another war of aggression in the years ahead. To some extent, however, this is all déjà vu. Thirty years ago last month, the Budapest Memorandum was signed.

On his first day back in office, U.S. President Donald Trump took the first step toward possibly renewing the sanctions that he imposed against senior International Criminal Court (ICC) personnel during his first presidency. The last time, Trump incurred public outrage but nothing more. This time, he could find himself criminally charged—creating a headache and risk almost every time that he travels internationally.

The Memorandum is important inter alia because it reminds us of the important distinction between political commitments and legal obligations. When negotiations began, Ukraine "sought legally binding guarantees from the [United States] that it would intervene should Ukraine's sovereignty be breached." Although it was forced to settle for less, Ukraine nonetheless has sought to frame the Memorandum in international legal terms, including perhaps by registering it with the Secretariat of the United Nations in 2014 for inclusion within the UN Treaty Series (although the Treaty Series includes not only treaties but also "international agreements").
Notwithstanding Ukraine's claims regarding international law, the Budapest Memorandum is a non-legally binding document reflecting political commitments rather than international law. This fact should not be overstated. It seems implausible that, had the Memorandum reflected legal obligations, Russia would have refrained from breaching Ukraine's sovereignty and invading its territory.
Nonetheless, the parties to the agreement, non-legal though it may be, "clearly intended that it not be devoid of meaning altogether." Regardless of the legal character of the Memorandum, Ukraine "acceded to nuclear disarmament as its side of the bargain." In any event, recent public discourse between Ukrainian and Russian officials regarding the legal character of the Memorandum demonstrates that States care deeply about the normative status of their commitments. In this regard, international law remains relevant, including in the context of today's most pressing global security challenges.